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Abstract
We present a new algorithm for computing pure-strategy ε-Bayes-Nash equilibria (ε-BNEs) in
combinatorial auctions. The main innovation of our algorithm is to separate the algorithm’s search
phase (for finding the ε-BNE) from the verification phase (for computing the ε). Using this ap-
proach, we obtain an algorithm that is both very fast and provides theoretical guarantees on the ε it
finds. Our main contribution is a verification method which, surprisingly, allows us to upper bound
the ε across the whole continuous value space without making assumptions about the mechanism.
Using our algorithm, we can now compute ε-BNEs in multi-minded domains that are significantly
more complex than what was previously possible to solve. We release our code under an open-
source license to enable researchers to perform algorithmic analyses of auctions, to enable bidders
to analyze different strategies, and many other applications.
1. Introduction
Combinatorial auctions (CA) are used to allocate multiple, indivisible goods to multiple bidders.
CAs allow bidders to express complex preferences on the space of all bundles of goods, taking into
account that goods can be complements or substitutes (Cramton et al., 2006). They have found
widespread use in practice, including for the sale of radio spectrum licenses (Cramton, 2013), for
the procurement of industrial goods (Sandholm, 2013), and for the allocation of TV ad slots (Goet-
zendorff et al., 2015).
Unfortunately, the strategyproof VCG mechanism (Vickrey, 1961; Clarke, 1971; Groves, 1973)
has several serious flaws when applied to the CA setting: most notably, it can lead to very low
or even zero revenues despite high competition for the goods (Ausubel & Milgrom, 2006). Fur-
thermore, it leaves incentives for collusion (Day & Milgrom, 2008). For these reasons, many CAs
∗. This paper is a significantly extended version of Bosshard et al. (2017), which was published in the conference
proceedings of IJCAI’17.
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conducted in practice do not use VCG, instead opting for alternative payment rules, such as first-
price payments (also known as “pay-as-bid”) or other payment rules, typically from the class of
core-selecting rules, which are designed to make the winners’ payments high enough to guarantee
envy-freeness (Day & Milgrom, 2008). These alternative mechanisms are not strategyproof in gen-
eral settings, and the behavior of bidders under them is not well understood. If we want to predict
auction outcomes in terms of desirable properties (such as incentives, revenue, efficiency), we must
therefore study them in equilibrium instead of at truth. As a first step, this requires us to choose a
suitable equilibrium concept.
1.1 Equilibria in CAs
In the full information setting, significant theoretical work has been done towards characterizing the
equilibria of CAs. For first-price payments, the set of Nash equilibia has been fully characterized
((Bernheim & Whinston, 1986); see (Milgrom, 2004, Chapter 8.2) for a modern treatment. Day and
Raghavan (2007) showed that an analogous characterization holds for any payment rule that always
selects bidder-Pareto-optimal core payments. While the full information Nash equilibrium (NE)
may be a good approximation of bidder behavior in some settings (e.g., repeated auctions where
bidders can reasonably be assumed to know others’ values), it has several issues: there is a high
multiplicity of equilibria, and each equilibrium must be supported by very precise bids on losing
packages. The latter issue is especially problematic, since in a full information setting, a losing
bidder would know a priori that he will not win any items, and thus has no reason to participate in the
auction at all. However, this bidder’s losing bid may be needed to keep the winners in equilibrium.
For more details on the issues of equilibrium selection and stability, see the discussions in Bernheim
and Whinston (1986) and Day and Raghavan (2007).
In addition to these theoretical issues, many real-world high-stakes auctions such as spectrum
auctions are only conducted once, and bidders work hard to keep their private information secret,
motivating the study of incomplete information settings. In such a setting, private information is
explicitly modelled by assuming that each bidder knows his own valuation but only has a prior
belief (i.e., a distribution) over the valuations of others. This leads to the solution concept of the
Bayes-Nash Equilibrium (BNE), where bidders maximize their expected utility over many possible
auction outcomes, weighted according to their beliefs.
Some analytical research into BNEs already exists. Non-combinatorial single-item auctions
have been studied extensively (Klemperer, 1999), but comparatively little is known about multi-
item auctions, as the difficulty of finding BNEs by hand increases markedly, requiring the solution
of challenging differential equations. For this reason, only a few analytical results exist in small
settings, most notably the Local-Local-Global (LLG) domain with two goods and three bidders
(which we define in Section 2.2). Ausubel and Baranov (2018) as well as Goeree and Lien (2016)
have independently derived the analytical BNE of the VCG-nearest or “quadratic” rule, which is
commonly used in practice (Day & Cramton, 2012). Furthermore, Ausubel and Baranov (2013)
have also derived analytical BNEs of three other payment rules. For first-price payments, Baranov
(2010) provides some necessary properties of BNEs, but does not fully characterize them.
As known analytical methods are not amenable to larger settings, the only feasible approach to
finding equilibria in such settings in through algorithmic methods. One limitation of this approach
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is that equilibria are not known to exist in general, but only in specific settings.1 Nevertheless, every
strategy profile is an ε-BNE for some ε. Thus, finding an ε-BNE with ε being as small as possible
is a well-defined problem, and an algorithm for solving this problem can be an important tool for
auction designers to analyze existing mechanisms and to design new ones.
1.2 Prior Algorithmic Work on Computing BNEs
Computer scientists have long worked on algorithms for computing equilibria in non-cooperative
games. The Gambit software package provides a number of algorithms to find NEs and BNEs
(McKelvey & McLennan, 1996; McKelvey et al., 2016), but only for finite games (with finite type
and action spaces). Solving auction games with even a modest number of types (valuations) and
actions quickly becomes infeasible with these general solvers; therefore, infinite games can only be
modeled with significant loss of fidelity. This is why researchers have turned towards developing
special-purpose algorithms for computing BNEs in CAs. One important class of BNE algorithms is
based on iterated best response (also known as fictitious play). The algorithms proposed by Reeves
and Wellman (2004), Vorobeychik and Wellman (2008) and Rabinovich et al. (2013) belong to this
class. To keep the computation manageable, all three algorithms simplify the strategy space (using
piecewise linear strategies, multiplicative shading strategies, or a finite set of actions, respectively)
before solving the simplified auction game.
A fundamental limitation of this “simplify, then solve” approach is that the ε-BNE computed
is only valid within the space over which the algorithm searches for best responses. If this issue is
not handled carefully, it can lead to what we call the false precision problem: the modelling choices
that were made to speed up the computation end up distorting the auction game in meaningful ways,
and the equilibrium that is calculated might not be as good as the algorithm reports.2 To illustrate
this point, consider the following simple but striking thought experiment: We search for an ε-BNE
in a CA, but restrict the bidders’ actions to bidding zero on all bundles of items. Any iterated best
response algorithm will immediately find an ε-BNE with ε = 0, as there is no beneficial deviation.
Obviously, this 0-BNE only “survives” because bidders are artificially prevented from meaningfully
participating in the auction.
Restricting the action space of a game in order to make equilibrium computation easier is known
as action abstraction (Sandholm, 2015). For some types of finite games, abstraction methods have
been developed that guarantee that an equilibrium of the abstracted game can be translated into
an equilibrium of the original game, with a bound on how much the coarseness of the abstraction
affects the solution quality (Sandholm & Singh, 2012). Unfortunately, no such methods exist for
infinite games. A recent algorithm proposed by Bosshard et al. (2018) could be interpreted as a
kind of action abstraction for auctions, but it is only applicable to auctions where the payment rule
is non-decreasing (e.g., first-price auctions).
1. The general CA problem has a structure much richer than what is covered by the single crossing condition (Athey,
2001) or other approaches for games with discontinuous payoffs (see, e.g., McLennan et al. (2011)). There have
been som results for restricted classes of auctions, such as uniform price auctions (McAdams, 2006), double auctions
(Jackson & Swinkels, 2005), and games with discrete actions and continuous single-dimensional types (Rabinovich
et al., 2013).
2. Note that Vorobeychik and Wellman (2008)[Sec. 7.4] correctly state this limitation of their algorithm. Rabinovich
et al. (2013) also handle this issue correctly by only claiming to find the BNE in the “game with the restricted strategy
space.”. Reeves and Wellman (2004) restrict themselves to a class of auctions where the best response is guaranteed
to lie in the restricted strategy space.
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1.3 Overview of our Contribution
In this paper, we develop an algorithm that is fast, without sacrificing accuracy in the formalization
of the auction game or the equilibrium computed within this game. For this purpose, we set up an
algorithm framework (Section 3) that protects against the false precision problem. This framework
splits the task of computing an ε-BNE into a a search phase and a verification phase.
In the search phase, our goal is to find an ε-BNE as quickly as possible. For this, we employ
a variant of the iterated best response algorithm highly optimized to CAs, operating in a restricted
subspace of all possible strategies (Section 4). We use many numerical techniques to cut down on
computation time, resulting in a fast algorithm. The result of the search phase is an equilibrium
candidate: a strategy profile likely to offer only small incentives to deviate for any bidder, but for
which the algorithm, at this time, only has an estimate of the ε (i.e., the incentives to deviate).
In the verification phase, our goal is to find an ε such that the equilibrium candidate is in fact
an ε-BNE. For this, it is important to compare the quality of the equilibrium candidate against the
best alternative strategies available in the full strategy space, without the restrictions imposed dur-
ing search. The main technical contribution of our paper is a verification procedure that computes
a theoretical upper bound on ε, taking into account the full strategy space of the auction game, i.e.,
the entire continuum of valuations and actions (Section 5). It is surprising that it is even possible
to derive such a theoretical bound, given that any algorithm can only evaluate a finite number of
individual valuations and actions, while the bound requires reasoning over the continuous value and
action spaces. To the best of our knowledge, our approach is the first to achieve such guarantees for
infinite games without restricting the strategy space. Our results require some mild theoretical con-
ditions to hold (most notably, independent distributions of bidders’ valuations), so we also provide
a second verification procedure that robustly estimates ε in arbitrary CA settings. This alternative
approach ensures that our algorithm is fully general. While it only produces an estimated ε, we also
show experimentally that, with sufficient computation time, the estimated ε and the upper bound on
ε converge towards each other.
We validate our approach by running a series of experiments in the LLG domain with two items
and three bidders. Our experiments show that the techniques we use significantly speed up our
algorithm’s runtime and that our algorithm converges consistently despite the use of randomness.
Moving beyond single-dimensional instances like LLG, we also discuss the difficulties of scaling
any BNE algorithm to high-dimensional auctions (Section 7). We introduce the new multi-minded
LLLLGG domain with eight goods and six bidders, which is much larger than any domain that
previous algorithms have been able to tackle. In this domain, we find accurate ε-BNEs for both
the VCG-nearest and first-price payment rules, which demonstrates the scaling capabilities of our
algorithm, and sets a benchmark for future work on BNE algorithms.
There are multiple use cases for our BNE algorithm. First, researchers may use it for the pur-
pose of auction design, e.g., when automatically searching for optimal payment rules within a given
design space (Lubin et al., 2015; Bu¨nz et al., 2018). Other researchers may find our algorithm
useful when analyzing specific aspects of CAs, like the impact of reserve prices (Day & Cram-
ton, 2012), incentives for overbidding in CAs (Beck & Ott, 2013), or as a supporting tool for
finding and validating new analytical results (Baranov, 2010). Actual bidders participating in an
auction could use our algorithm to optimize their bidding, e.g., by analyzing the effect of different
strategies under a given CA design. Further, bidders that are contemplating whether to partici-
pate in an auction could use our algorithm to better understand their economic position in a given
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competitive landscape. To enable all of these use cases, we explain how to use our software and
describe its main features (Section 8), and we release our code under an open-source license at
https://github.com/marketdesignresearch/CA-BNE.
2. Preliminaries
2.1 Formal Model
COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS
A combinatorial auction (CA) is used to sell a set M = {1, 2, . . . ,m} of goods to a set N =
{1, 2, . . . , n} of bidders. Each bidder i has a value vi(K) ∈ R≥0 for each bundle of goodsK ∈ 2M .
We assume that these values are normalized such that vi(∅) = 0. It is often the case that a bidder
is only interested in a small set of d different bundles {K1, . . . ,Kd}, having strictly positive value
for each of those d bundles, and value 0 for all others. Therefore, it is convenient to represent the
bidder’s valuation vi as a point in the d-dimensional value space Rd≥0, where d can be between 1
and 2m − 1, depending on the setting.
The bidder submits a (possibly non-truthful) bid to the auction. To simplify the exposition, we
adopt the XOR bidding language (Nisan, 2006), but our algorithm and results generalize to other
bidding languages. In our model, every bidder is allowed to submit an XOR bid with exactly r ∈ N
atomic bids (i.e., expressing a value for r different bundles), where the r and the set of atoms is fixed
a priori for each bidder. Note that setting r = 2m − 1 allows bidders to express arbitrary valuations
over the entire bundle space. This modeling choice is thus without loss of generality. However,
our model also allows for smaller r, capturing bidders who focus their attention on a specific set of
bundles. Given this, bidder i’s bid can be represented by a point bi in the action space Rr≥0. We do
not assume free disposal, and therefore the value for all bundles for which a bidders does not submit
a bid is implicitly zero. The bid profile b = (b1, . . . , bn) is the vector of all bids. The bid profile of
every bidder except i is denoted b-i.
The CA has an allocation rule X assigning bundle Xi(b) to bidder i, and we assume that the
allocation it produces is always feasible, i.e., ∀i, j ∈ N : Xi(b) ∩ Xj(b) = ∅.3 The CA also has
a payment rule p which is a function assigning a payment pi(b) ∈ R≥0 to each bidder. We let
ui(vi, X(b), p(b)) denote bidder i’s utility for an auction outcome, given his own valuation vi, an
allocation X(b), and payments p(b). Since the allocation and payment rules X and p are always
fixed in each auction, bidder i’s utility only depends on the bid profile b, so we abbreviate the utility
as ui(vi, b), or equivalently ui(vi, bi, b-i).
CAS AS BAYESIAN GAMES
We model the process of bidding in a CA as a Bayesian game.4 Each bidder knows his own valuation
vi, but he only has probabilistic information (i.e., a prior) over each other bidder j’s valuation vj ,
represented by the random variable Vj .5 The joint prior V = (V1, . . . , Vn) is common knowledge
and consistent among all bidders. Each bidder chooses a strategy si : Rd≥0 7→ Rr≥0, which is a
3. In much of the literature, it is typically assumed that the allocation rule is efficient (i.e., maximizes the sum of
bidders’ reported values). Of course, our model covers this case, but it is much more general, as it can handle
arbitrary allocation rules, including approximately efficient ones, or rules targeting other objectives such as revenue.
4. In the game theory literature, a bidder would be called a player, and his valuation vi would be called his type.
5. To simplify the language, we always use he/his when referring to a bidder.
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function mapping all of his possible valuations to bids. We thus assume that all strategies are pure
and not mixed.
In this setting, the goal of bidder i is to maximize his utility ui(vi, bi, b-i) in expectation over the
distribution of bids b-i of all other bidders, where b-i = s-i(v-i). This leads to the expected utility u¯i
defined as
u¯i(vi, bi) := E
v-i∼V-i|Vi=vi
[ui(vi, bi, s-i(v-i))] , (1)
where V-i|Vi = vi is the conditional distribution of valuations of all other bidders, which can depend
on the realization of Vi (when the distributions of valuations are not independent).
The highest possible expected utility that can be achieved with any bid is the best response
utility, given by
u¯BRi (vi) = sup
b′i∈Rr≥0
u¯i(vi, b
′
i). (2)
Note that we take the supremum over bids instead of the maximum, because the maximum might
not exist due to discontinuities in the utility function.6 Whenever a bidder i submits a bid bi that is
not optimal he leaves a certain amount of utility “on the table.” We call this quantity the utility loss,
given by
li(vi, bi) := u¯
BR
i (vi)− u¯i(vi, bi). (3)
Bidders are in an ε-Bayes-Nash equilibrium when the utility loss is smaller than ε for all possible
valuations of all bidders, i.e., no bidder has a profitable deviation from the equilibrium netting him
more than ε utility in expectation:
Definition 1. An ε-Bayes-Nash equilibrium (ε-BNE) is a strategy profile s∗ such that
∀i ∈ N, ∀vi ∈ Vi : li(vi, s∗i (vi)) ≤ ε.
We take the ε-BNE as our solution concept because we use numerical algorithms with limited
precision to find the BNEs. Thus, when we solve a CA, we mean that we find an ε-BNE, where ε is
a suitably small constant fixed a priori.
Remark 1. Throughout the paper, we sometimes refer to the “true” ε of a strategy profile s∗. By
this we mean the smallest ε such that s∗ is an ε-BNE.
2.2 The LLG Domain and Straightforward Bundle Bidding
In this paper, we study the performance of our BNE algorithm, first in a small domain, where
analytical results are available, and later in a novel larger domain (Section 7). For the former we use
the widely-studied Local-Local-Global (LLG) domain (Ausubel & Milgrom, 2006). LLG is one of
the smallest examples of an auction where combinatorial interactions between bidders arise. There
are two local bidders, each of whom is interested in a different single good, and a global bidder who
is interested in the package of both goods.
6. Consider, e.g., a single-item first-price auction with complete information. If opponents bid a maximum amount of
x, the best response is often to outbid them by a small amount, i.e., to bid limδ→0 x+ δ. Analogues of this situation
can arise even in incomplete information settings, where a discontinuity arises due to i’s bid crossing over a threshold
where his probability of winning a certain bundle jumps by a discrete amount. Such thresholds are caused by point
masses in the distribution s-i(V-i|Vi = vi), which can occur even if the distribution of V-i|Vi = vi itself is smooth,
e.g., when strategies have flat segments.
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This domain has been widely studied, and analytical BNE results for it are available under sev-
eral mechanisms. Ausubel and Baranov (2013) study the case where the global bidder’s valuation
is drawn from U [0, 2], while the local bidders’ valuations are drawn from U [0, 1], with distribution
F (v) = vα. Furthermore, the local bidders’ valuations are perfectly correlated with probability
γ, and independent otherwise. Within this framing, they derive analytical BNEs for four different
core-selecting payment rules (VCG-nearest, Nearest-bid, Proxy and Proportional). These BNEs are
unique under the assumption that local bidder strategies are symmetric. Adopting their results as
our benchmark, we assemble a set of 16 auction settings to be used as a test suite: four payment
rules each applied to four domains (α ∈ {1, 2} × γ ∈ {0, 0.5}). Note that our selection of settings
covers all payment rules for which analytical results are known and all interesting regions in the
(α, γ)-parameter space for which the analytical results have distinct functional forms (Ausubel &
Baranov, 2013).7 Importantly, we did not exclude any settings for modeling or algorithmic tractabil-
ity reasons.
In the literature on LLG, it is often assumed (sometimes implicitly) that the local bidders can
only bid on the good they are directly interested in (Ausubel & Baranov, 2018; Goeree & Lien,
2016).8 This implements what we call “straightforward bundle bidding:” The bidder submits an
atomic bid on each bundle that has strictly positive marginal value, i.e., where removing any part of
the bundle would strictly decrease the value. Formally:
Definition 2. An XOR bid bi is a straightforward bundle bid if the bid contains one atomic bid for
each bundle in the set
{K ⊆M | ∀K ′ ⊂ K : vi(K ′) < vi(K)} (4)
and no other atomic bids.
For our analysis of LLG, we will follow the majority of prior work and also assume straightfor-
ward bundle bidding. Because in LLG, every bidder is single-minded (i.e., only interested in one
bundle), we thus set r = 1. Given that all of our payment rules are minimum-revenue core-selecting,
we know that it is a dominant strategy for the global bidder to be truthful (Beck & Ott, 2013). Thus,
in LLG, computing the ε-BNE only involves computing the strategies for the local bidders. Further-
more, to match the analytical results of Ausubel and Baranov (2013), we only consider symmetric
equilibria in this domain (though this simplification is not essential to our algorithm). Thus, the
whole strategy profile in LLG can be described by one function slocal : [0, 1] 7→ R≥0.
3. BNE Algorithm Framework
In this section, we present a high-level overview of our BNE algorithm. At its core, the algorithm
is based on iterated best response dynamics, also known as fictitious play (Brown, 1951). This is an
iterative algorithm, where in each iteration, each bidder updates his strategy to be a best response to
the other bidders’ strategies from the previous iteration. The algorithm terminates when the utility
loss across all bidders is small enough.
The key difference between our algorithm and the classic iterated best response procedure is that
our algorithm is separated into a search phase and a verification phase (with the search phase being
7. We excluded some simple settings where the analytical solution is just a multiplicative shade.
8. One exception to this is the work by Beck and Ott (2013), who have analyzed a specific payment rule in LLG with
r = 3, thus allowing bids on all non-empty bundles in this case.
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Algorithm 1: Iterated Best Response (with Verification)
Data: MechanismM, Distribution V of bidder valuations
Result: ε-BNE strategy profile
1 s := truthful strategies
2 repeat
3 repeat
4 foreach bidder i do
5 s′i := BestResponseInner(M, V, s-i)
6 end
7 ε˜ := UtilityLoss(s, s′)
8 s := Update(s, s′)
9 until ConvergedInner(ε˜)
10 foreach bidder i do
11 s′i := BestResponseOuter(M, V, s-i)
12 end
13 ε˜ := UtilityLoss(s, s′)
14 s := Update(s, s′)
15 until ConvergedOuter(ε˜)
16 s∗ := ConvertStrategies(s)
17 ε := Verification(s∗)
18 return (s∗, ε)
outer
loop
inner
loop
search
phase
verification
phase
further split into an inner loop and an outer loop). Our full algorithm is presented as Algorithm 1
and described below at a high level.
In the first step, we initialize the strategy profile to be used during the search at truth (Line 1).
The search phase constitutes the first part of the algorithm (Lines 2-15). The core of the search
phase consists of the inner loop (Lines 3-9), in which iterated best response is performed. Each
iteration consists of calculating a best response for each bidder in turn (Lines 4-6), computing the
utility loss (Line 7), updating the current strategy profile (Line 8), and checking for convergence
(Line 9). Note that the strategy update we perform is a dampened update such that each bidder’s
new strategy is a mixture of his old strategy and his best response.9 When the inner loop converges,
we repeat the same steps in the outer loop (Lines 10-15), this time configured with higher precision.
If the outer loop fails to converge, we go back into the inner loop again, and so on. These two
nested loops help the algorithm to converge reliably without expending too much computational
effort; we will discuss the role of the outer loop in more detail in Section 6. Once the outer loop has
converged as well (Line 15), we have arrived at a strategy profile that is an equilibrium candidate,
which concludes the search phase. We then proceed to the verification phase (Lines 16-17), where
the ε corresponding to this equilibrium candidate is computed. Finally, we return a strategy profile
s∗ and ε (Line 18), such that s∗ is an ε-BNE.
To instantiate Algorithm 1, we still need to define how to compute best responses (Line 5) and
how to perform verification (Line 17). Turning to the former, the best response BRi is a strategy
9. This is a standard method to prevent oscillations around the solution, a phenomenon typical of any procedure that
iteratively searches for fixed points.
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(a) Search phase. (b) Verification phase.
Figure 1: Illustration of piecewise linear strategies as used in our algorithm when applied to LLG, with the
proxy payment rule, α = 1.0, and γ = 0.5. (a) Strategies after two iterations (shown in blue) and three
iterations (shown in purple), with pointwise best responses used to perform the update (shown in red). (b)
Strategy after eleven iterations, with pointwise best responses used for verification.
for bidder i maximizing i’s expected utility u¯i(vi, bi) for each possible valuation vi:
BRi(vi) := arg max
bi∈Rr≥0
u¯i(vi, bi). (5)
Here, the expected utility u¯i(vi, bi) is calculated with respect to the strategy profile s-i of the previ-
ous round.10 In the rest of this section, we go into the details of how to compute the best response
according to Equation (5), and we provide an overview of the verification phase.
3.1 Modeling Strategies
To compute best responses efficiently, we model bidders’ strategies using piecewise linear functions.
Such a piecewise linear strategy is defined by specifying a series of control points, which are simply
valuations (e.g., elements of [0, 1] in the case of LLG), and then assigning a bid to each control point
(for details on the placement of control points, see Section 4). To extend this to a strategy over the
full value space, we linearly interpolate between the bids at neighboring control points. Note that
there are many other classes of functions that one might use to represent strategies (e.g., piecewise
constant functions, splines, etc); we find piecewise linear strategies to be particularly attractive as
they are simple (and thus fast to evaluate) but can approximate any bounded function well, given a
sufficient number of control points.
10. Note that a best response need not always exist due to discontinuities in the utility function (as discussed in Sec-
tion 2.1). Because of this, in our algorithm, we must accept a bid bi with utility very close to the best response utility
u¯BRi (vi) in place of a true best response.
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Using piecewise linear strategies, the task of constructing the best response BRi given in Equa-
tion (5) simplifies to finding the bid BRi(vi) for each control point vi, which we call the pointwise
best response at vi. We will discuss the subproblem of finding pointwise best responses in the next
subsection. Note that this algorithm design implies that we only search for best responses within
a restricted strategy space, namely the space of all piecewise linear functions. However, this is not
problematic since we later verify that the final ε-BNE is valid in the full strategy space.
An example of piecewise linear strategies for the LLG domain is shown in Figure 1a. In the
figure, we observe the pointwise best responses, the dampened update of the bids at each control
point, and the linear interpolation to the full strategy.
3.2 Pointwise Best Responses
To compute the (piecewise linear) best response BRi over the whole value space, we need to com-
pute many pointwise best responsesBRi(vi), i.e., find the bid bi that maximizes the expected utility
u¯i(vi, bi) for a fixed valuation vi. This means that at each such vi, we must solve an unconstrained
optimization problem over the whole action space (i.e., the set of possible bids). This is computa-
tionally expensive and can only be approximated with numerical algorithms that evaluate u¯i(vi, bi)
at many different bids bi. Furthermore, the function to be optimized may be non-convex and/or
non-differentiable in bi (as discussed in Section 2.1). There are no known algorithms that can solve
non-convex optimization problems to global optimality in finite computation time. For this reason,
we employ a sophisticated version of pattern search (see Section 4.7) which can quickly find highly
accurate best responses.11
Evaluating the expected utility u¯i(vi, bi) is already a challenge for a fixed vi and bi because it
involves solving the following high-dimensional integral:
u¯i(vi, bi) =
∫
v-i
ui(vi, bi, s-i(v-i))f-i(v-i) dv-i. (6)
Here, f-i is the joint PDF associated with the distribution of valuations of all other bidders, marginal-
ized over vi. The dimensionality of the integral is (n−1) ·d for an auction with n bidders and value
space dimension d. Consequently, to solve this integral, we use Monte Carlo integration, a tech-
nique that works by averaging the integrand ui(vi, bi, s-i(v-i))f-i(v-i) over many samples of the
variable of integration v-i, taken uniformly at random over all its possible realizations.12
Remark 2. In the simple LLG setting, the integral in Equation (6) is only two-dimensional and thus
may alternatively be solved via numerical quadrature in less time. In larger domains, however, only
Monte Carlo (MC) techniques will scale efficiently with the problem dimension. To keep the presen-
tation of the algorithmic techniques comparable throughout the paper, we exclusively evaluate their
performance using MC integration. Our released source code includes both implementations.
11. Vorobeychik and Wellman (2008) proposed a best response procedure with global convergence guarantees that can
be applied to auctions. However, because their procedure is not guaranteed to converge in finite time, we do not
employ it in our algorithm.
12. Note that Monte Carlo integration only computes an estimate of the true value of the integral. We could use a concen-
tration inequality (e.g., Hoeffding (1963)) to derive a confidence interval around this estimate. In our experiments,
we choose a very large number of Monte Carlo samples such that the estimate becomes very accurate (by the central
limit theorem); given this, we forego computing confidence intervals, following standard practice using Monte Carlo
integration. However, in Section 6.2, we provide an analysis of the numerical robustness of the overall algorithm.
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3.3 Verification
In the search phase, we are free to simplify the strategy space or make use of any other heuristics
to speed up the search. As a consequence, we only have an estimate of the ε of our current strategy
profile, i.e., the maximum of the utility loss li at all control points. This estimate is precise enough
to decide when to break out of the search phase. But to know that we have found an ε-BNE strategy
profile, we need to make sure that the utility loss is indeed less than ε at all valuations.
At first sight, it is not obvious how to achieve this, given that the value space is continuous, and
we can thus not simply evaluate the utility loss at every possible valuation. To address this problem,
we have developed Theorem 2 which enables us to bound the epsilon over the full value space using
only a finite number of verification points (as illustrated in Figure 1b). We devote Section 5 to
a detailed explanation of this approach. For now, we highlight that the verification phase of the
algorithm (Lines 16-17) is significantly enhanced by this theory. Note that in those settings where
the conditions of the theorem are not met, we fall back on an alternative verification method that
computes an estimate of the ε (Section 5.3).
In the next section, we describe the design of the search phase in detail. Note that our experi-
mental setup in that section will already require us to be able to compute the ε of a given strategy
profile using a verification method. In the next section, we will simply treat the verification phase
as a black box that provides us with the ε for any given strategy profile. Then, in Section 5, we will
explain our verification methods in detail.
4. The Search Phase
In this section, we turn our attention towards the details of the search phase. Recall that, in the
search phase, our goal is to find an ε-BNE as quickly as possible. For this, it is important to observe
that the runtime of each round of iterated best response depends on three key parameters: (1) the
number of Monte Carlo samples used for integrating the expected utility, (2) the number of times
the expected utility is evaluated to find each pointwise best response, and (3) the number of control
points at which the pointwise best response is computed. To achieve a fast runtime of our algorithm,
these parameters need to be kept as small as possible, while ensuring that we are still able to find
ε-BNEs across a wide variety of settings. This whole section shows how to achieve this. Towards
this end, we first present a baseline algorithm for computing best responses, and then provide a
series of algorithmic improvements, explaining and testing each of them in turn. The application of
all of our techniques leads to a cumulative 203.1-fold speedup of our algorithm over the baseline,
allowing us to find ε-BNEs in only a few seconds in LLG.
4.1 Experimental Set-up
We evaluate the runtime of each algorithmic improvement on the test set of 16 different variations
of the LLG domain (as introduced in Section 2.2). We use this test set because finding ε-BNEs is
still tractable in this small setting, and it enables us to compare our results against known analytical
BNEs, as we will do in Section 6.2. We run each version of our algorithm 50 times on each of the
16 auction settings, and we report the average of these 800 runs.13 Runtime results for finding a
13. To simplify replicability, we use a different but fixed random seed for each of the runs. This set-up makes our experi-
ments deterministic (in the sense that they are perfectly repeatable) while still capturing the effects of randomness on
our algorithm’s runtime.
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0.00001-BNE are presented in Table 1. Each run is performed single-threaded on a 2.8Ghz Intel
Xeon E5-2680 v2.
Note that several of our techniques make a trade-off between speed and accuracy, so it is im-
portant to evaluate their effectiveness as a whole to capture how changes in accuracy affect the
convergence rate and thus the speed of the overall algorithm. Therefore, we do not just measure a
single best response calculation in isolation, but measure the runtime of the entire algorithm from its
start at the truthful strategy profile until reaching convergence. However, the runtime of the whole
algorithm is also affected by (a) how the transition between search and verification is done, and (b)
the runtime of the verification phase itself. This introduces additional ambiguity regarding the true
performance of our search techniques. For this reason, in this section, we separate these effects
by only measuring the runtime of the inner loop of Algorithm 1 (i.e., the core of the iterated best
response procedure). We do this by skipping the convergence check in Line 9 and running the inner
loop for a large, fixed number of iterations instead. For each of the strategy profiles visited by this
process, we then run our verification phase to determine the first iteration at which ε falls below
the threshold of 0.00001 (our target ε), at which point we consider the search to have converged.
Importantly, the runtime numbers we report in this section exclude the time needed for verification.
To understand the performance of the full algorithm, we then perform an end-to-end analysis in
Section 6, including the outer loop and the verification phase.
4.2 Naive Monte Carlo Sampling and the Problem of Variance
We first present a straightforward implementation of our BNE algorithm. We lay an evenly-spaced
grid of 160 control points over the value space, and at each control point vi, we maximize u¯i(vi, .)
by running Brent search, a commonly-used form of unconstrained optimization over the space of
possible bids (Brent, 1971). Each evaluation of u¯i(vi, bi) is done via Monte Carlo integration as
described in Section 3.2.
This version of the algorithm is a reasonable first step, but it fails to converge to our target
ε = 0.00001, even when using 200, 000 Monte Carlo samples. The reason for this is that the com-
putation of the expected utility u¯i has very high variance. In MC integration methods, any reduction
in variance is always desirable, of course, but in our application this consideration is especially
important. In an iterated best response algorithm, computing an equilibrium is fundamentally a dy-
namic process, where the output of one iteration is fed as input into the next. When we have high
variance in the expected utility computation, this causes the computed best response to deviate from
the true best response in a random direction at each control point. Since an ε-BNE is defined by the
worst-case utility loss over all valuations of all bidders, a large error at a single control point during
the best response computation prevents the entire algorithm from converging. This can produce the
counter-intuitive effect that increasing the number of control points actually decreases the accuracy
of the algorithm.
Our first two algorithmic improvements address this issue, reducing the variance of the Monte
Carlo integration to acceptable levels. The third version of the algorithm is the first one that con-
verges to our target ε, so we will use that one as the baseline algorithm against which we measure
the performance impact of later improvements.
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Algorithm AverageIterations
Average Runtime
in Seconds
Cumulative
Speedup
Naive Monte Carlo - - -
+ Importance Sampling - - -
+ Quasi-Random Numbers (baseline) 8.9 (0.082) 950.5 (10.94) -
+ Common Random Numbers 8.4 (0.073) 26.7 (0.37) 35.7 x
+ Adaptive Dampening 5.9 (0.049) 18.7 (0.24) 50.7 x
+ Pattern Search 5.9 (0.048) 15.0 (0.14) 63.2 x
+ Adaptive Control Points 6.1 (0.052) 4.7 (0.04) 203.1 x
Table 1: Runtimes for the inner loop of our algorithm, with standard errors shown in paretheses. We compare
the time required for different variants of our algorithm to achieve an estimated 0.00001-BNE, averaged over
50 runs in each of our 16 auction settings. Note that the first two variants of the algorithm did not converge
on all 800 instances.
4.3 Importance Sampling
In a standard CA the utility of a bidder is exactly zero when he bids too little to win any of the
goods. In those cases, we can restrict the MC sampling process to only draw valuations v-i from
the region where i wins a non-empty bundle. This is not straightforward to do, because to compute
the expected utility correctly, we need a way of sampling from this region without distorting the
probabilities of other bidders’ valuations. This can be achieved by implementing a variant of im-
portance sampling (Press et al., 2007), where we change the distribution that we are sampling from,
but correct for this change by appropriately weighting the samples obtained.
In the LLG domain, suppose we are computing the expected utility u¯1(v1, b1) for local bidder
1. We draw a sample v2 for the other local bidder according to his distribution and compute the
bid b2 = slocal(v2), but then instead of drawing a sample for the global bidder from U [0, 2], we
draw it from U [0, b1 + b2], which guarantees that the local bidders win, since the sum of their bids
will always be higher than the global bidders’ bid. The resulting sample now has a higher density
than it should, because the global bidder would naturally have density 1/2 for this bid, but our
sampling procedure is altering the density to be 1/(b1 + b2), so we are overweighting the region
that our sample landed in. Multiplying the utility resulting from this sample with the correction
factor (b1 + b2)/2 cancels this out, leaving us with an unbiased estimator of the expected utility.
This technique is especially important for small bids where the local bidder only wins rarely, where
otherwise very few samples would fall in the winning region, leading to high variance.
While highly useful, even with this improvement our algorithm still fails to converge on all
instances, so this version of the algorithm is also not suitable as a baseline. For that, we will need
to add another improvement.
4.4 Quasi-Random Numbers
Another effective method for reducing variance is to replace pseudo-random numbers (i.e., the
standard random number implementation available in most programming languages) with quasi-
random numbers in the sampling process. While pseudo-random numbers try to reproduce the
properties of true random numbers as closely as possible (including their tendency to form clumps),
quasi-random numbers cover the sampled region more evenly (Morokoff & Caflisch, 1995). In our
algorithm, we use a multi-dimensional Sobol sequence; this modification enables convergence to
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our target of ε = 0.00001, using 200,000 MC samples. On average, the search converges in 8.9
iterations and 950.5 seconds (see Table 1). As this is the first variant of the algorithm that reaches
convergence, we use it as the baseline algorithm against which we compare additional techniques.
Remark 3. The number of samples required for convergence might seem surprisingly high. Many
of our auction instances would also converge using considerably fewer samples, but 200,000 is the
minimum number required to make even the most difficult of our 16 auction settings converge in
50 out of 50 runs. To keep our experimental set-up simple and consistent, we did not optimize the
number of samples on a per-instance basis, but rather chose a single number that makes our full set
of 800 runs converge.
4.5 Common Random Numbers
In the best response computation, we repeatedly compare the expected utility of two different bids
for a bidder with a given valuation. If X and Y are the random variables representing the expected
utility associated with two bids, then we want to determine if E[X]−E[Y ] is greater or smaller than
zero to decide which bid is better. Using common random numbers (Glasserman & Yao, 1992),
we can compute E[X − Y ] instead and get the same result with lower variance. We integrate this
idea by using the same sequence of samples to compute both E[X] and E[Y ]. The samples used
for both integrals are pairwise perfectly correlated but still quasi-random when considering each
of the integrals in isolation. Adding this technique, we get convergence to our target ε using only
10,000 samples, i.e., 5% of the samples needed by the baseline algorithm, resulting in a 35.7-fold
speedup. Note that we get more than a 20-fold speedup because, in addition to saving a factor 20 in
the expected utility computation, this change decreases the number of function evaluations required
by Brent search for finding the best response, and additionally makes the algorithm converge in
slightly fewer iterations.
4.6 Adaptive Dampening of Strategy Updates
As mentioned in Section 3, in each round of the iterative best response loop we perform a dampened
update of the strategy profile. This means that instead of just replacing the previous strategy with
its best response (as would be done in a naive implementation of iterative best response), we make
the current strategy a weighted combination of the previous strategy and the best response: si =
(1 − w) · si + w · BRi(vi, s-i), for some update weight w ∈ [0, 1]. However, if w is chosen too
high, the iterative process might fall into an oscillating behavior around the solution and converge
very slowly or not at all. Conversely, if w is chosen too low, convergence is slowed down when the
current strategy is far from equilibrium. In the baseline algorithm, we use an update weight w = 0.5
to balance these two concerns, but of course a fixed update weight is suboptimal.
To make the convergence process of the algorithm smoother, we now design an adaptive form of
strategy updates (see Fudenberg and Levine (1995) and Lubin and Parkes (2009) for earlier work on
adaptive dampening). Concretely, we set the update weight dynamically for each individual control
point, based on how close to a solution we expect to be:
w(vi) =
2
pi
arctan(c · li(vi, si(vi))) · (wmax − wmin) + wmin. (7)
To understand the effect of the rule, observe that 2pi arctan maps all positive numbers into the
[0, 1) interval, and therefore Equation (7) creates a weight between wmin and wmax, separately for
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each control point.14 Thus, when the utility loss li at the control point vi is large, the weight w(vi) is
also large, resulting in an aggressive update step that reaches the neighborhood of an equilibrium in
few iterations. Conversely, when the utility loss is small, the update step is much more conservative,
reducing the risk of overshooting the equilibrium. This allows for the big steps of a large weight,
while simultaneously enjoying the stability properties corresponding to a smaller weight. Adding
adaptive dampening results in another 1.42-fold speedup, leading to a cumulative 50.7-fold speedup
over the baseline algorithm.
4.7 Pattern Search
While Brent search is a very accurate method for function maximization, it has two problems.
First, it evaluates the function to be maximized many times. Second, it can only be applied to
single-dimensional functions, and thus prevents us from applying our algorithm to larger, multi-
dimensional auction instances (including those we will study in Section 7).
To address these issues, we replace Brent search with pattern search (Hooke & Jeeves, 1961),
an optimization procedure that requires many fewer function evaluations and scales to an arbitrary
number of dimensions.
Pattern search is a type of hierarchical local search that evaluates a number of points around the
best solution currently known, according to a fixed pattern. If a better solution is found, it moves
the center of the pattern there and continues searching. If not, it reduces the size of the pattern
by half and continues searching at the current point. Thus, there are two kinds of steps that can
occur during the search: moving and shrinking. The search normally terminates when the pattern
reaches a sufficiently small scale. However, choosing the correct time to stop the search is not an
easy problem: high precision is wasteful when we are far away from an ε-BNE, but is required to
converge with high accuracy.
In our algorithm, we adjust the precision of pattern search adaptively. The idea is that, when
the current bid si(vi) is still far from optimal, we do not want to perform too many shrinking
steps because this precision would be wasteful, given that the strategy profile is still moving a lot.
Conversely, when we are close to convergence, we need to perform many shrinking steps to get
high precision. Concretely, in LLG, we use a pattern of 3 points. For each pattern search invocation
we use a budget of 12 steps, where each moving step consumes two units from the budget and
each shrinking step consumes only one. Overall, this budgeted pattern search technique requires
fewer evaluations of the expected utility than Brent search when high precision is unnecessary,
and is almost as accurate when high precision is needed. Adding budgeted pattern search to our
algorithm results in a 1.24-fold speedup, leading to a cumulative 63.2-fold speedup over the baseline
algorithm.
4.8 Adaptive Control Point Placement
BNE strategies often have regions of both high and low curvature (see Figure 1b in Section 3), and
thus using an equal spacing of control points is inefficient because it uses many unnecessary points
in flat regions in order to reach sufficient accuracy in curved regions. To avoid this, we initialize our
algorithm with an evenly spaced grid of only a few control points (10 in LLG). We then repeatedly
place additional points at the midpoint of those segments where the curvature of the best response
14. In our experiments we use the constants wmin = 0.2, wmax = 0.7, and c = 12ε .
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function is largest. We estimate the curvature by approximating the second derivative with finite
differences.
Using this adaptive method, the control points are spaced further apart in regions of low curva-
ture (where linear interpolation provides a good approximation), allowing us to reduce the overall
number of control points. Using adaptive control points, we obtain convergence in all 16 auction
settings with only 40 control points instead of the 160 previously required. Adding adaptive control
points to our algorithm results in a 3.21-fold speedup, leading to an overall 203.1-fold speedup. The
cumulative improvement achieved by adding all of the techniques in this section means that our al-
gorithm can find very precise ε-BNEs in the LLG domain using only a few seconds of computation
time.
5. The Verification Phase
Now that we have a fast algorithm to find an ε-BNE candidate, it remains to show how to accurately
compute ε. This is the task of the verification phase. We have already established that the utility
loss is small at each control point used in the search phase; otherwise, the algorithm would not have
broken out of the iterated best response loop. However, a computation of ε requires us to find the
maximum utility loss at every point in the continuum of valuations. Unfortunately, the maximum is
not a well-behaved statistic, in the sense that even if we were to check the utility loss at more and
more control points, we would never be sure that there is no gap remaining between the worst utility
loss we have observed and the worst utility loss that exists.15 This is why we need to think carefully
about the design of the verification phase.
On a high level, our verification method (and main contribution of the paper) involves reasoning
about the utility loss in terms of intervals [vi, v′i] of valuations. The key insight lies in using certain
properties of the endpoints vi and v′i to provide an upper bound that holds for any valuation contained
in the interval. This approach is almost fully general: it works for auctions with any allocation and
payment rule, but we must make a few assumptions on the bidders’ valuations and utilities. We
formalize our results in Theorems 1 and 2 developed in Section 5.1, and we discuss the application
of these results in Section 5.2.16
For those settings where the assumptions of Theorems 1 and 2 are not satisfied, we fall back
on an alternative verification method that computes an estimate of ε instead of an upper bound.
Because it does not make any theoretical assumptions it is applicable to any model of bidder valu-
ations and any allocation and payment rule. This ensures that our algorithm can always provide an
implementation of the verification phase, and is therefore fully general. We present this alternative
verification method in Section 5.3. In Section 5.4, we show that, when using sufficient computation
time, the upper bound on ε as well as the estimated ε are very close to the true ε.
Remark 4. Note that both of our verification methods require the computation of pointwise best
responses. For verification to be as accurate as possible, we increase the precision of the pointwise
best response computation in this phase. For instance, in LLG, we use twice as many Monte Carlo
15. This is a different dynamic than, e.g., computing the average of a function, where taking more and more samples
guarantees convergence towards the exact solution, even in continuous domains.
16. Note that Theorems 1 and 2 are significantly stronger versions of the theorem we presented in (Bosshard et al., 2017)
producing much tighter bounds on ε. The general idea of using a finite subset of the value space to obtain a bound on
the whole value space was also used more recently by Balcan et al. (2019) who employ learning theory to estimate
approximate incentive compatibility of non-truthful mechanisms.
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samples than during search, and we increase the budget of steps for pattern search from 12 to 20.
This means that our pattern search can perform up to 20 halvings of the initial pattern size, and is
thus able to detect improvements in utilities from bids located in an extremely small neighborhood
centered around the equilibrium bid s∗i (vi).
5.1 Deriving an Upper Bound on ε
Our upper bound on ε requires three properties to hold regarding the bidders in the CA:
Assumption 1 (Linear Utilities). Utility functions are of the form
ui(vi, b,X, p) = vi(Xi(b))− pi(b), (8)
i.e., linear in the valuation vi.
Assumption 2 (Bounded Value Spaces). The valuations Vi are random variables with bounded
support.
Assumption 3 (Independently Distributed Valuations). The valuations Vi are mutually independent
random variables.
Assumption 1 is relatively standard in auction theory. This class of utility functions is a subset of
quasi-linear utilities (Mas-Colell et al., 1995); it excludes some bidder models that are less common,
e.g., quasi-linear utilities with risk aversion. Assumption 2 is also standard and not very restrictive.
In contrast, Assumption 3 is more restrictive. It excludes all CAs with interdependent valuations
(which includes settings where bidders’ private values depend on publicly observable signals).
To derive a bound on ε, we need to know the gap between the expected utility u¯i(vi, bi) obtained
at an equilibrium candidate s, and the expected utility u¯BRi (vi) that can be obtained by playing a best
response against s-i. To bound the gap between these two functions, we now make two observations.
First, the fact that utilities are linear in the valuation implies that the expected utilities are linear in
the valuation as well:
Lemma 1. In a CA satisfying Assumption 1 (linear utilities) and Assumption 3 (independently
distributed valuations), for a fixed bid bi, the expected utility u¯i(vi, bi) is a linear function in vi.
Proof. This follows from linearity of expectation. In detail:
u¯i(vi, bi) = E
v-i∼V-i|Vi=vi
[vi(Xi(bi, s-i(v-i)))− pi(bi, s-i(v-i))]
= E
v-i∼V-i|Vi=vi
 ∑
K⊆M
vi(K) · [Xi(bi, s-i(v-i)) = K]− pi(bi, s-i(v-i))

=
∑
K⊆M
vi(K) · E
v-i∼V-i|Vi=vi
[Xi(bi, s-i(v-i)) = K]− E
v-i∼V-i|Vi=vi
[pi(bi, s-i(v-i))]
=
∑
K⊆M
vi(K) · cKi − ci.
Note that cKi and ci are constants independent of vi because valuations are independently distributed.
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Second, we show that the best response utility u¯BRi (vi) is convex:
Lemma 2. In a CA satisfying Assumption 1 (linear utilities) and Assumption 3 (independently
distributed valuations), the best response utility u¯BRi (vi) is convex.
Proof. Per Lemma 1, the expected utility u¯i(vi, bi) is linear in vi for a particular bid bi and therefore
also convex. The best response utility u¯BRi (vi) is the pointwise supremum of the expected utilities
associated with each possible bid bi. Therefore, it is the upper envelope of a set of convex functions,
which is known to be convex.
In addition to Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, Theorems 1 and 2 will require the use of piecewise
constant strategies. Our BNE candidate s does not fulfill this requirement, as the strategies con-
structed by our algorithm in the search phase are piecewise linear. To deal with this, we slightly
alter the strategy profile found during search such that all strategies are piecewise constant. This
step corresponds to the ConvertStrategies subroutine of Algorithm 1 (Line 16). Note that
our algorithm always returns a pair (s∗, ε), with s∗ being an ε-BNE. In this way, we eliminate any
ambiguity about the exact strategy profile ε applies to.
5.1.1 UPPER BOUND IN ONE DIMENSION
As a first step, we state a theorem for the upper bound for one-dimensional value spaces, i.e., when
bidders are single-minded. This will help in developing the necessary intuition. Afterwards, we will
state our result for the general case and provide a formal proof.
In the one-dimensional case, Assumption 2 implies that there are two valuations vmini and v
max
i ,
such that Pr
[
Vi < v
min
i
]
= 0 and Pr [Vi > vmaxi ] = 0. Then, a piecewise constant strategy si is
uniquely defined by a finite set of grid points w1i < w
2
i < . . . < w
J
i , and a bid si(w
j
i ) for each grid
point wji . The grid must cover the entire value space, that is w
1
i ≤ vmini and wJi ≥ vmaxi . For any
valuation vi, we then have that si(vi) = si(w
j
i ), where w
j
i is the gridpoint closest to vi from below.
Having defined piecewise constant strategies for the single-minded case, we are now ready to
state our first theorem, upper bounding the ε for this case:
Theorem 1. Let s∗ be a strategy profile of a CA satisfying Assumption 1 (linear utilities) Assump-
tion 2 (bounded value spaces) and Assumption 3 (independently distributed valuations). If each
strategy s∗i is piecewise constant with gridpoints w
1
i , . . . , w
J
i , then s
∗ is an ε-BNE with
ε ≤ max
i∈N
max
j∈{2,...,J}
max
wi∈{wj−1i ,wji }
u¯BRi (wi) − u¯i
(
wi, s
∗
i
(
wj−1i
))
. (9)
The way the theorem works is as follows: In Equation (9), we bound ε separately for each
bidder and each interval between two grid points, with bidders being indexed by i and intervals
being indexed by j. For a pair of adjacent grid points wj−1i and w
j
i , we observe two things. First,
all values vi in the interval [w
j−1
i , w
j
i ) have the same equilibrium bid, namely s
∗
i (w
j−1
i ), yielding
linearly increasing expected utility by Lemma 1. Thus, the equilibrium utility is a piecewise linear
function. Second, the best response utility is convex in vi by Lemma 2, and can thus be bounded
from above by the secant between wj−1i and w
j
i . Figure 2 illustrates the situation graphically. At
any vi, the vertical distance between these two lines is an upper bound for the utility loss. Now,
the difference between two linear functions is also linear, and thus achieves its maximum at the
boundary of the interval. Therefore, it is enough to check this distance at wj−1i and w
j
i to compute
a bound on the utility loss for all vi between them.
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ui(vi, s
∗
i (vi))
uBRi (vi)
vi valuation
utility
(a) Equilibrium utility (blue) and best response
utility (red).
wj−1i w
j
i valuation
utility
(b) The maximum utility loss is bounded by two
linear functions.
Figure 2: Illustration of Theorem 1. Plots are from valuations to utility. Left: the utility that bidder i obtains in
equilibrium (which is piecewise linear), plotted against the highest utility he could achieve for any bid (which
is convex). Right: The utility loss at any valuation between two control points is at most the difference
between two linear functions. The maximum of this difference must be achieved at one of the control points.
5.1.2 UPPER BOUND IN HIGHER DIMENSIONS
We now proceed to the general case, where bidders can be arbitrarily multi-minded. This is more
technically involved, as it requires considering the topology of high-dimensional partitions of the
value space, and the best response utility must be bounded by a set of simplices. We begin by
introducing the notation required to define piecewise constant strategies in the general case.
Definition 3 (Cell). A cell [x, y) ⊆ Rd is a half-open multi-dimensional interval with lower corner
x and upper corner y, i.e.,
[x, y) :=
d×
j=1
[xj , yj).
For convenience, we consider [x, x) to be the singleton {x}, instead of ∅.
Definition 4 (Vertex). The vertices of a cell [x, y) are
Vert(x, y) := {xi + (yi − xi) · z | z ∈ {0, 1}d}, (10)
where “·” denotes coordinate-wise vector multiplication.
Definition 5 (Cell Partition). A cell partition P of a bounded value space Vi ⊆ Rd is a set of cells
such that each point in the value space that has strictly positive density falls into exactly one cell,
i.e.,
∀vi ∈ Vi ∃! [wi, w′i) ∈ P : vi ∈ [wi, w′i).
See Figure 3 for some examples of cell partitions on the 2-dimensional unit cube. Note that the
upper boundary of the cube needs to be covered by cells as well, which is why the partitions include
not only 2-dimensional rectangles, but also 1-dimensional lines and even a 0-dimensional point.
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Figure 3: Top row: three examples of partitioning the 2-dimensional unit cube. Bottom row: Individual cells
of each partition, including lower-dimensional boundary cells. Left: regular grid. Center: non-uniform grid.
Right: partition not based on a grid.
Definition 6 (Piecewise Constant Strategy). Let P be a cell partition. A strategy si is piecewise
constant on P if every value has the same bid as the lower corner of the cell it belongs to, i.e.,
∀[w,w′) ∈ P ∀vi ∈ [w,w′) : si(vi) = si(w).
With all definitions properly in place, we are now ready to state and prove our main result.
Theorem 2. Let s∗ be a strategy profile of a CA satisfying Assumption 1 (linear utilities) Assump-
tion 2 (bounded value spaces) and Assumption 3 (independently distributed valuations). If each
strategy s∗i is piecewise constant on some cell partition Pi, then s
∗ is an ε-BNE with
ε ≤ max
i∈N
max
[wmini ,w
max
i )∈Pi
max
wi∈V ert(wmini ,wmaxi )
u¯BRi (wi) − u¯i
(
wi, s
∗
i
(
wmini
))
. (11)
Proof. To establish that s∗ is an ε-BNE, we need to show that
∀i∀vi : ε ≥ li(vi, s∗i (vi)). (12)
Consider an arbitrary bidder i and valuation vi. Let [wmini , w
max
i ) be the unique cell in Pi with
vi ∈ [wmini , wmaxi ). We triangulate Vert(wmini , wmaxi ) with a set of simplices that cover the entire cell
(Haiman, 1991). This means that vi is contained in some simplex Z with vertices {z1i , . . . , zr+1i } ⊆
Vert(wmini , w
max
i ). We have that vi is a convex combination of the z
k
i , i.e.,
∃λ1, . . . , λr+1 ∈ [0, 1] :
r+1∑
k=1
λk = 1 ∧ vi =
r+1∑
k=1
λkzki , (13)
It follows from convexity of u¯BRi that
u¯BRi (vi) = u¯
BR
i
(
r+1∑
k=1
λkzki
)
≤
r+1∑
k=1
λku¯BRi (z
k
i ) =: f(vi), (14)
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and because strategies are piecewise constant, we have that
u¯i(vi, s
∗
i (vi)) = u¯i(vi, s
∗
i (w
min
i )) =: g(vi). (15)
Note that both f and g are linear functions over Z. The utility loss li(vi, s∗i (vi)) is at most the
difference f(vi) − g(vi), which is also linear and thus attains its maximum at one of Z’s vertices.
Note that at a vertex zki , f(z
k
i ) = u¯
BR
i (z
k
i ), and by construction z
k
i ∈ Vert(wmini , wmaxi ). Therefore,
the term f(zki ) − g(zki ) corresponding to each vertex of Z is included in the maximization of (11)
which implies that the utility loss at each valuation contained in the simplex Z is smaller than ε.
Note that Theorem 2 is an exact multi-dimensional analogue of Theorem 1. While it may be
intuitive to see why Theorem 1 holds in the single-dimensional setting, there is some added difficulty
in proving Theorem 2 for the multi-dimensional setting: here, we have to deal with piecewise
constant strategies in arbitrary dimensions (by generalizing the notion of an interval to a cell), and
convexity arguments are harder to make. Having done this additional work, we have thus shown
that our result holds for domains with arbitrarily complex valuations.
5.2 Application of Theorem 2
Using Theorem 2 to produce a bound with our algorithm is straightforward: once we have a strategy
profile s∗ (converted to be piecewise constant), we compute a pointwise best response at each cell
vertex wi, which provides all the information we need to compute ε according to (11), namely the
equilibrium utility u¯i(wi, s∗i (wi)) and the best response utility u¯
BR
i (wi). The triangulation with
simplices used in the proof does not need to be actually constructed.
One thing to note is that the theorem can be applied no matter how we come up with the ε-BNE
candidate s. In this paper, we use an iterative best response algorithm, but this could be exchanged
for any other equilibrium finding procedure. For example, our verification step can also be applied
to compute the incentives to deviate from truth-telling under a given mechanism, by simply using
the truthful strategy profile as the “ε-BNE candidate.”
Note that while we have focused on the application of our results to infinite games, Theorem 2
can easily handle finite, but very large value and action spaces. In either case, it is infeasible to
perform computations for each individual value or action, which is where our approach shines. The
key ingredient that makes our theory work is that for a fixed action, the payoffs in the auction game
are linear in the valuation.
5.3 An Estimate of ε
Note that our theoretical results only hold under certain conditions, given as Assumptions 1, 2 and
3 above. These assumptions do not hold for all CAs that might be of interest: in particular, half of
our set of 16 LLG instances have correlated valuations (i.e, γ = 0.5), which violates Assumption 3.
For such auction instances, we fall back on a simpler verification procedure, which consists of
computing best responses on a densely spaced grid of valuations, and estimating ε as the highest
utility loss observed among these valuations. This ε estimate is obviously a lower bound for ε.
However, as mentioned earlier, the maximum is not a well-behaved (smooth) statistic, so it is not
clear if our ε estimate is close to the true ε or not.
In practice, we have found that this heuristic is a sensible fallback for domains where our the-
oretical assumptions do not hold. The worst case scenario for our heuristic is when there are ex-
tremely small regions in the value space where the utility loss of a given strategy is much higher
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than at neighboring valuations. We have never observed this scenario in the auction games we
have studied, where valuations close to each other obtain similar expected utilities under similar
bid profiles.17 We reinforce this claim by comparing both verification methods with each other in
Section 5.4.
Remark 5. Recall that, in the runtime experiments performed in Section 4 in the LLG domain, we
required an implementation of the verification phase as part of our experimental setup (to accurately
measure the performance of the search phase). In those experiments, half the auction settings
have correlated valuations, and thus Theorem 2 is not applicable. To keep our experimental set-up
simple and consistent, we chose to always use the heuristic method described above to compute an
estimated ε, even for instances where our theoretical assumptions hold. For this, we used a grid of
1, 000 evenly spaced verification points, which is a very large increase in precision when compared
to only 40 adaptively placed control points used during search.
5.4 The Theoretical Bound on ε vs. the Estimate of ε
We have now established the theory necessary to get an upper bound on the utility loss, but this
would not be very useful if the bound was far from the true ε. It is thus natural to ask: how tight
is our bound really? Luckily, we can answer this question using our ε estimate, which is clearly a
lower bound on the utility loss, since it is derived by considering a finite subset of all valuations.
We consider the 8 of our 16 LLG auction settings to which Theorem 2 applies, namely those with
independently distributed valuations (γ = 0). For each setting, we take the strategy profile resulting
from a full run of our algorithm, and compare the lower and upper ε bounds, using the same number
of verification points in both cases.
The result is shown in Figure 4, with the number of verification points varying from 2 to 213, and
the bounds being the average over the 8 auction settings. We observe that the lower bound remains
practically constant, while the upper bound decreases polynomially in the number of verification
points until converging.18 At 213 verification points, the upper and lower bounds match within
machine precision. Even with as few as 29 verification points, the gap between the two bounds
already becomes extremely small. The results are qualitatively the same when considering each
auction separately.
Note that the true ε always lies between the upper and lower bounds. Because the two bounds
converge towards each other, this shows that both bounds are very close to the true ε with suffi-
ciently many verification points. This implies that the upper bound is relatively “tight,” and that the
estimated ε we used in our experiments in Section 4 was actually a good estimate.
6. Putting it all Together
Now that we have detailed specifications of both the search and verification phases, we can put
them together into a full algorithm. Recall that, for the design of the search phase, we focused
17. Note that there do exist some ill-behaved payment rules under which small changes in the bid profile lead to wildly
different payments for bidder i, even when i himself does not change his bid. Similarly, there exist joint value
distributions where a small change in value for bidder i implies a very large shift in the marginal distribution of
other bidders, which in turn can drastically change i’s utility. Therefore, any strengthening of our theoretical results
would need to place significant restrictions both on the payment rule and the correlation structure between bidders’
valuations.
18. Note that a polynomial relationship corresponds to a straight line on the plot, since it is drawn on a log-log scale.
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Figure 4: Estimate (lower bound) and upper bound for ε of the ε-BNEs obtained by our algorithm, aver-
aged over eight different auction settings with uncorrelated bidder valuations. The estimate is computed as
described in Section 5.3, while the upper bound is given by Theorem 2.
on the performance of the inner loop of the algorithm, to keep our experimental set-up simple
(Section 4). We then designed the verification phase (Section 5). Now we analyze the performance
of the algorithm as a whole, which includes the decision regarding when to transition from search
to verification.
6.1 Transitioning from Search to Verification
Recall that our BNE algorithm has a target ε it is trying to achieve. During the search phase, the
algorithm only maintains an estimate ε˜ of the true current ε, but does not yet have an upper bound
on it. Thus, if the algorithm spends too little computational effort in search and stops early, there is
a high risk that the verification phase will show that the target ε has not in fact been reached. On the
other hand, if the algorithm expends lots of effort in the search phase, this risk can be minimized.
The question thus is how long to search, and when exactly to transition from search to verification.
The amount of computational effort spent is primarily driven by the number of control points
used, and this in turn determines to a large degree the accuracy of ε˜ which the search phase uses
for its decision regarding when to transition to verification. This motivates our design of two nested
loops, with an inner and an outer loop. When the inner loop converges, a best response calculation
with higher precision is performed in the outer loop, increasing the accuracy of the strategy update
and of the ε˜ calculation. If this increase in accuracy still leads to an acceptably small ε˜, the algo-
rithm proceeds to verification. Otherwise, the inner loop is resumed, and we require at least two
further iterations before breaking out of the inner loop again. In this way, the outer loop acts as a
gate between the inner loop and the verification phase, only letting through a strategy profile that
“generalizes” to higher precision parameters. For this to work properly, we eschew adaptive control
points when in the outer loop, instead using evenly spread out control points densely covering the
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Figure 5: Runtimes for the whole algorithm in LLG including both the search and verification phases, for
50 runs on each of our 16 auction settings. The box plots provide the first, second and third quartiles; the
whiskers are at the 5th and 95th percentile.
entire value space. Furthermore, to account for the lower accuracy of the inner loop, we consider
the inner loop to be converged only when an ε˜ less than or equal to 0.8 times our target ε is reached.
With this transition from search to verification in place, we can now measure the full runtime
of the algorithm from start to end, i.e., from the (truthful) starting strategy profile to a verified ε-
BNE. For this experiment only, we choose the number of control points in the outer loop to match
those in the verification phase. This simplifies interpreting our runtime results, because this set of
parameters achieves an ε below our target in all 800 out of 800 runs, and thus we don’t have to
account for the failure rate of the algorithm. In practice, tuning the configuration of the outer loop
involves a classical speed / accuracy trade-off, and it is up to the user of our BNE algorithm to make
this trade-off appropriately.
The runtimes of all 800 runs are shown in Figure 5. Across all rules and settings, the median
runtime of our whole algorithm is 107.1 seconds (see the right-most box plot in the figure). Of
course, there is some variance in the runtimes for each auction instance, both across our 16 settings
and within each setting. However, overall, the runtimes are remarkably consistent, with 90% of all
auction instances completing within 83.9 and 157.5 seconds. Thus, a user of our BNE algorithm
can expect similar runtimes when applying our algorithm to similar settings.
6.2 Convergence Analysis
When our algorithm has converged to a strategy profile s∗ and computed an ε, how much certainty
should we attribute to this result? Given that our algorithm uses random numbers quite extensively,
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Mechanism Standard Deviation of ε Max L∞ to
Search Verification Analytical BNE
Nearest-Bid, α = 1.0, γ = 0.0 4.2728× 10−7 2.3365× 10−7 0.0027
Nearest-Bid, α = 1.0, γ = 0.5 1.2367× 10−7 6.3426× 10−8 0.0014
Nearest-Bid, α = 2.0, γ = 0.0 4.4019× 10−7 1.8765× 10−7 0.0025
Nearest-Bid, α = 2.0, γ = 0.5 1.2306× 10−7 6.6614× 10−8 0.0016
Proportional, α = 1.0, γ = 0.0 1.2454× 10−9 2.0800× 10−9 0.0014
Proportional, α = 1.0, γ = 0.5 3.2826× 10−9 2.8195× 10−9 0.0009
Proportional, α = 2.0, γ = 0.0 1.6587× 10−9 2.5590× 10−9 0.0015
Proportional, α = 2.0, γ = 0.5 1.1225× 10−7 3.9069× 10−9 0.0011
Proxy, α = 1.0, γ = 0.0 1.4144× 10−9 1.6041× 10−9 0.0025
Proxy, α = 1.0, γ = 0.5 5.5414× 10−7 5.0385× 10−9 0.0016
Proxy, α = 2.0, γ = 0.0 2.0589× 10−7 1.5618× 10−9 0.0039
Proxy, α = 2.0, γ = 0.5 5.3069× 10−9 4.0216× 10−9 0.0017
Quadratic, α = 1.0, γ = 0.0 1.2856× 10−9 1.9825× 10−9 0.0014
Quadratic, α = 1.0, γ = 0.5 2.6187× 10−9 2.7807× 10−9 0.0009
Quadratic, α = 2.0, γ = 0.0 1.8548× 10−9 2.3149× 10−9 0.0015
Quadratic, α = 2.0, γ = 0.5 1.5953× 10−7 3.7011× 10−9 0.0011
Table 2: Robustness measures of our algorithm in the LLG setting. The second and third columns show how
much randomness is introduced by Monte Carlo integration in the search and verification phase, respectively,
measured as the standard deviation of ε over 50 runs each. The forth column shows the maximum L∞
distance between the known analytical BNEs and our ε-BNEs (ε = 0.00001), also measured over 50 runs.
one might worry that s∗ and ε may be subject to large variance. To address this concern, we run
some additional experiments and show that this randomness only negligibly affects the quality of
our results.
However, testing the consistency of the ε is not straightforward: the ε is “self-reported” by the
algorithm, and thus any variance in ε could be due to differences in the strategy profiles found in the
search phase, or differences in the computation of ε in the verification phase. To deal with this, we
consider the variance of the search and verification phases in isolation from each other, by running
two separate experiments for each auction setting. In the first experiment, we perform 50 runs
with different random seeds during search, which are then run through verification using a single
fixed seed. This tells us the variance of ε caused by search. In the second experiment, we again
perform 50 runs, this time using a fixed random seed during search (thus converging on the exact
same strategy profile), and different random seeds during verification. This tells us the variance of
ε caused by verification.
The results are shown in columns two and three of Table 2. We observe that the standard
deviation of ε is extremely small in all cases, never exceeding 5.5414× 10−7. This shows that,
even though our algorithm is optimized to use as few Monte Carlo samples as possible, we can
expect the algorithm’s behavior to be very consistent across different runs.
Now that we have shown that our BNE algorithm converges in a very consistent way, one may
wonder about what BNE strategy profile it converges to. Recall that we have analytical results
for all of our 16 settings. Thus, we can measure the distance between the true, analytical BNEs
and the ε-BNEs our algorithm finds. However, we would like to emphasize that minimizing this
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Bidder Bundle 1 Bundle 2
L1 AB BC
L2 CD DE
L3 EF FG
L4 GH HA
G1 ABCD EFGH
G2 CDEF GHAB
(a) Bundles of interest of each bidder. (b) Graphical representation of bundle overlap.
Table 3: The multi-minded LLLLGG domain. There are four local bidders and two global bidders, competing
for eight goods A-H. Each bidder is interested in exactly two bundles.
distance is not part of the definition of an ε-BNE and therefore not an objective of our algorithm.
Nevertheless, some readers may be interested in knowing this distance. To this end, we consider the
BNEs resulting from the previous experiment in each setting. In Table 2, we show the maximum
(across all 50 runs) of the L∞ distances between the analytical BNEs from Ausubel and Baranov
(2013) and the 0.00001-BNEs we find. As we can see, all analytical BNEs are very close to our
ε-BNEs, never differing by more than 0.0039. This also shows that our ε-BNEs are close to each
other, further confirming the low variance of our algorithm.
Remark 6. Originally, we found a discrepancy between some of the ε-BNEs reached by our al-
gorithm (for Nearest-Bid with α = 2 and 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1) and the analytical BNEs in Ausubel and
Baranov (2013). We contacted the authors, who promptly confirmed a small mistake in their an-
alytical results and quickly provided us with the correct BNE formula for this setting, which is:
si(vi) = 1/
√
8 · (1− γ)
(
log(
√
2/(1− γ) + vi)− log(
√
2/(1− γ)− vi)
)
. Our comparison in
Table 2 takes this correction into account. Such a correction highlights the value of having numeri-
cal techniques for finding BNEs, even in simple domains, as a complement to analytical methods.
7. Scaling to Higher Dimensions
In this section, we show how to scale our BNE algorithm to higher dimensions. To this end, we
introduce a new domain with six bidders and eight goods, where bidders are multi-minded, i.e.,
they have a positive value for more than one bundle. Numerically finding ε-BNEs in this setting
is a significant increase in complexity over single-minded domains such as LLG. Thus, our algo-
rithm significantly surpasses the previous state of the art, which allows us to analyze new types of
combinatorial interactions between bidders in much larger settings.
7.1 The multi-minded LLLLGG Domain
We now introduce the novel multi-minded LLLLGG domain, which is a synthetic domain along the
lines of LLG, but with significantly increased complexity. The domain has six bidders and eight
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goods (labeled A −H for ease of exposition), with each bidder being interested in two bundles as
enumerated in Table 3. There are four “local” bidders L1 - L4 who draw each of their two bundle
values from U [0, 1], and two “global” bidders G1 and G2 who draw their two bundle values from
U [0, 2]; all draws are independent. For the global bidders, the two bundles are perfect substitutes
(even though they are not overlapping), such that a bidder will never want to win both bundles
at the same time. For the local bidders, their bundles of interest are partially overlapping such
that they can obviously only ever win one of them. We assume straightforward bundle bidding as
defined in Section 2, and thus each bid bi consists of r = 2 atomic bids. Because the domain exhibits
significant symmetries (see Table 3b), we can search for symmetric equilibria where all local bidders
have the same strategy and both global bidders have the same strategy. Thus, a strategy profile is
fully described by a pair of strategies slocal : [0, 1]2 7→ R2≥0 and sglobal : [0, 2]2 7→ R2≥0.
The Source of Complexity. Note that LLLLGG is larger than LLG in several aspects: it has more
bidders, more goods, each bidder bids on more bundles, and no bidder has a truthful strategy. It is
thus natural to ask how exactly these characteristics influence the difficulty of finding ε-BNEs in
this domain. Some effects are very easy and intuitive to understand. First and most importantly, to
find a pointwise best response, a nonlinear optimization problem over the action space Rr≥0 must be
solved, which is considerably harder when r = 2 than when r = 1. Second, our algorithm’s runtime
increases linearly with the number of (non-symmetric) bidders, because best responses need to be
computed for each of them. Third, the more atomic bids we have, the harder the implementation
of the mechanism itself becomes (e.g., because in general CAs, computing an efficient allocation or
computing core payments are both NP-hard problems).
However, there is a source of complexity that is much subtler, namely the combinatorial way
in which bidders interact. To this end, we now want to provide some intuition. First, consider a
first-price auction with a single good but many bidders. In this auction, finding a best response BRi
is not much more difficult than in the same auction with fewer bidders, because only the highest
competing bid is relevant for bidder i’s utility, and other bids can be safely ignored.19 Similarly,
having an auction with a large number of goods does not necessarily mean that finding an ε-BNE is
hard. For instance, if two goods are perfect complements for all bidders, then this pair of goods will
only ever be bid on together, effectively acting as a single good. It is thus possible for an auction
with many goods to have a combinatorial structure that is as simple as LLG.
The true difficulty of an auction setting is determined by the way in which the bundles that bid-
ders are interested in overlap with each other. To make this concrete, consider the integral that must
be solved each time the expected utility u¯i is computed. It is well-known that the convergence rate
of Monte Carlo integration is directly proportional to the variance of the function to be integrated,
and is independent of the dimension (Press et al., 2007). Thus, the number of Monte Carlo samples
we need to ensure convergence only depends on how complex the distribution of bidder i’s utility is,
not on how many bidders and goods are involved. The ε-BNEs we compute next will demonstrate
that the LLLLGG domain is indeed complex in this sense, exhibiting several novel and interesting
equilibrium features.
19. This idea has recently been formalized by Soumis et al. (2019), who define a variant of best response dynamics
based on return functions, which can explicitly model a large number players by their aggregated effect on a game’s
outcome. Our algorithm framework is compatible with this concept, as are most of the techniques we discuss in
Section 4.
27
Grid Size Runtime in Upper
Mechanism Inner Outer Verification Iterations Core-Hours Bound on ε
VCG-nearest 15× 15 25× 25 35× 35 5 3,921 0.0019
First-price 50× 50 75× 75 100× 100 10 198 0.0019
Table 4: Experimental data for our BNE algorithm applied to VCG-nearest and first-price in the multi-minded
LLLLGG domain (one run for each mechanism). The grid sizes have been chosen independently for the two
mechanisms to make them reach the same ε.
7.2 Experimental Results
We apply our full BNE algorithm to find ε-BNEs in the LLLLGG domain for two payment rules:
VCG-nearest and first-price. We first find good equilibria and then use Theorem 2 from Section 5 to
compute upper bounds on ε. The grid sizes we use for each domain and the resulting runtimes and
ε are shown in Table 4. For each iteration, we update all points in the grid as described in Section 4,
using 100,000 Monte Carlo samples to compute the expected utility. The pattern used in pattern
search is a grid of 3 × 3 points, with an initial grid spacing of 0.1 and a budget of 8 steps. During
verification, we increase the number of samples to 200,000, and the budget of steps to 12.20
Note that the runtime for VCG-nearest is orders of magnitude higher than that for first-price.
This is to be expected, because the payment rule itself requires solving a quadratic program to find
prices satisfying all core constraints, which is very expensive, even employing constraint generation
(Day & Raghavan, 2007; Bu¨nz et al., 2015).
The final strategy profiles found for both rules are depicted in Figures 6 and 7. To enhance visual
clarity, we show the equilibrium strategies in their piecewise linear form, before being converted to
piecewise constant, as is required for our upper bound (see Section 5). We now discuss the ε-BNE
strategies found by our algorithm in more detail.
Equilibrium of VCG-nearest. In Figure 6, we show the ε-BNE for the VCG-nearest payment
rule. The first thing we observe is that, overall, the equilibrium strategies are very close to truthful
bidding. The most striking feature of the equilibrium, however, is that the global bidders exhibit
significant overbidding behavior. Specifically, the global bidders bid higher than their value on
modestly valued bundles when their other bundle has a very high value. At first sight, this may seem
irrational. However, by overbidding the bidder shifts the VCG reference point, which can indirectly
decrease his payment. For instance, suppose that bidders G1, L3 and L4 win bundles ABCD, EF
and GH respectively. Bidder G1 has an incentive to overstate the value for EFGH: this will cause
the VCG reference point to increase for L3 and L4. If the value forABCD is very high forG1, then
this manipulation carries little risk of accidentally winning the low-valued EFGH bundle, and it
decreases the expected payment forABCD. Of course, the bidder must balance the possible upside
of overbidding with the potential risk of winning the lower-valued bundle at negative utility. Thus,
it is somewhat surprising to find such a strong overbidding effect in BNE. Note that the general
concept of overbidding in CAs has first been identified by Beck and Ott (2013), who studied this
phenomenon analytically in LLG for a stylized payment rule. We are the first to demonstrate that
the VCG-nearest, the rule most commonly used in practice, also exhibits this effect.
20. Note that we do not use importance sampling and adaptive control points for the experiments described in this section
as these two techniques are not yet implemented in our code base for higher-dimensional value spaces. Of course,
our algorithm would only get faster with these additions.
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Equilibrium of first-price. In Figure 7, we show the ε-BNE for the first-price payment rule. We
observe that, in contrast to VCG-nearest, here the strategies involve significantly more shading.
This is to be expected, given the incentive properties of the two rules. Furthermore, we see that, for
the local bidders, for a large region of their value space, their strategy is to bid close to zero. This
can be explained by the structure of the LLLLGG domain, which allows local bidders with very
low values to freeride on the (high) bids of other bidders. For the global bidder, the most striking
feature of his equilibrium strategy is that, when the value for one bundle is high and the value for
the other is low, the bid for the low-valued bundle is strongly shaded. This can again be explained
by the structure of the LLLLGG domain, where the two bundles of interest of the global bidder are
non-overlapping. Thus, in ε-BNE, the global bidder’s optimal strategy requires him to “get out of
his own way” such that he avoids winning a low-profit bundle when instead he could be winning a
much higher-profit bundle.
As we have shown in this section, our algorithm scales well to a domain that is significantly
larger than LLG. We would like to emphasize that no prior analytical or algorithmic work has
been able to solve domains of the size of LLLLGG. As our discussion of the VCG-nearest and
first-price rules has demonstrated, optimizing the bidding strategy of a multi-minded bidder (as in
LLLLGG) is significantly more complex than optimizing the strategy of a single-minded bidder (as
in LLG). Note that we consider our experiments only as a first step towards exploring the properties
of payment rules in larger domains where there are still many open questions that can be analyzed
using our algorithm. Additionally, we expect that other researchers will use the LLLLGG domain
as a benchmark for future algorithmic work.
8. Software Implementation of our BNE Algorithm
In this section, we describe the software implementation of our BNE algorithm, which is written
in Java 8. In particular, we briefly explain how to use the software and then discuss its main fea-
tures. We release the software publicly under an open-source license at https://github.com/
marketdesignresearch/CA-BNE. The code repository also contains three examples illustrat-
ing how to use our algorithm: the VCG-nearest rule applied to LLG, the first-price rule applied to
LLG (which is more challenging, since the global bidder is no longer truthful), and the first-price
rule applied to LLLLGG (with a modest default configuration that can be run on a laptop).
8.1 Usage
We provide example code in Listing 1 to show the overall structure of the code (we omit some
details in the listing for the purpose of clarity). The code is highly modular: it consists of a series
of different components, each responsible for one single aspect of the problem. Each component is
implemented as a Java class, so one implementation can easily be swapped out for another. These
components are plugged together via the BNESolverContext class. The overall algorithm is
then managed and executed via the BNEAlgorithm class. We first create the context that holds
the algorithm’s configuration (Line 1). Then we specify several of the algorithm’s core elements,
including pattern search (Line 3), Monte Carlo integration (Line 4), common random numbers
(Line 5), and dampened updates (Line 6). Next, we specify the auction setting which consists of a
mechanism class that specifies the allocation and payment rules (Line 8), and a sampler class that
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Figure 6: 0.0019-BNE of the multi-minded LLLLGG domain for the VCG-nearest payment rule. The top
two plots show the BNE strategies for the local bidders for the two bundles they bid on, and the bottom two
show the same for the global bidders.
Figure 7: 0.0019-BNE of the multi-minded LLLLGG domain for the first-price payment rule. The top two
plots show the BNE strategies for the local bidders for the two bundles they bid on, and the bottom two show
the same for the global bidders.
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1 BNESolverContext<Double,Double> context = new BNESolverContext<>();
2 ...
3 context.setOptimizer(new PatternSearch<>(...));
4 context.setIntegrator(new MCIntegrator<>(...));
5 context.setRng(2, new CommonRandomGenerator(...));
6 context.setUpdateRule(new UnivariateDampenedUpdateRule(...);
7 ...
8 context.setMechanism(new FirstPrice());
9 context.setSampler(new FirstPriceLLGSampler(context));
10 BNEAlgorithm<Double,Double> bneAlgo = new BNEAlgorithm<>(3,context);
11 ...
12 result = bneAlgo.run();
Listing 1: Example code for running our BNE Algorithm. The “...”s indicate code or function
arguments that we omit for clarity.
specifies the value distributions of bidders (Line 9).21 Then the BNE Algorithm class is initialized
with the context carrying all the configuration data (Line 10). Finally, the actual BNE algorithm is
started (Line 12).
8.2 Main Features
We wrote our code with performance, ease of use, and extensibility in mind. Note that these three
goals are sometimes at odds with each other, but we have attempted to do justice to each of them,
through careful software engineering. Our code provides the following main features:
1. Flexible Bidder Models. The value distributions and utility functions are simply imple-
mented as classes. All possible joint value distributions are supported, even those with com-
plex correlation structures. Nonlinear utilities (e.g., risk aversion) can easily be added. The
action space is not restricted toRr≥0, as our algorithm can also handle domain-specific bidding
languages, for example.
2. Flexible Mechanism Specification. It is straightforward to implement a novel allocation
or payment rule because they are simply provided by the user as a new class. This also
allows for writing fast, specialized implementations (e.g., for domains where special-purpose
algorithms for the winner determination problem are available) or the addition of features like
reserve prices.
3. No hard-coded Assumptions. Our BNE algorithm can also be run in settings where the
assumptions we make in Section 5 to derive the theoretical upper bound on ε are not satisfied.
In these settings, our algorithm simply falls back to our alternative verification method that
computes an estimated ε.
With these features, our code is easy to use and extend. It can thus immediately be used in
exploratory research and as a basis for further algorithmic work. We hope that providing access
21. Note that the sampler class provides a method for sampling from the marginal value distribution V-i|Vi = vi for a
given vi. This design choice makes our Monte Carlo sampling more efficient, more so than if the valuations were
implemented explicitly as a joint probability distribution.
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to our source code will enable the study of mechanisms and domains that were not previously
amenable to analytic or algorithmic analysis.
9. Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a new algorithm for finding ε-BNEs in CAs. The key difference
between our approach and prior work is that our algorithm is separated into a search phase and a
verification phase. This has enabled us to design a search phase that is highly optimized for speed
while still obtaining a provable bound on ε in the verification phase.
To address the high-dimensionality that drives the difficulty of the BNE search problem, sampling-
based approaches are needed, which in turn introduces variance. Therefore, we have employed
multiple variance reduction techniques in the search phase. Additionally, the key to obtain large
speed improvements was to think carefully about when and where to exert computational effort
(e.g., using adaptive control points). In the theory section, our key assumption was the linearity of
the utility function. This enabled us to make the necessary convexity argument to characterize the
gap between the equilibrium utility and the best response utility and to ultimately derive our theoret-
ical bound. Surprisingly, we were able to derive this bound without making any assumptions about
the allocation or payment rules, while at first sight, one may have expected that certain assumptions
(like Lipschitz-continuity) would have been necessary. For practical applications, it is important to
note that our algorithm computes an upper bound that is relatively ”tight,” in the sense that, with
sufficiently many verification points, the upper bound is very close to the true ε.
Our BNE algorithm can be used in several ways. First, researchers can use it, e.g., for the
purpose of auction design, for analyzing certain aspects of CAs, or for validating analytical re-
sults. Importantly, by enabling the algorithmic analysis of multi-minded domains like LLLLGG,
researchers can now explore many new effects that are not present in simple domains like LLG.
Second, bidders can use our algorithm, e.g., to analyze the effect of different strategies or when
contemplating whether to enter an auction in the first place. We hope that releasing our code under
an open-source license will enable those and many other applications in the future.
Finally, our work gives rise to promising directions for future research. First, an important
question is how to derive a bound for settings with correlation or non-linear utilities (which includes
risk-averse bidders). Note that without assumptions on the mechanism, no bound for correlated
settings can be derived. Thus, future work could explore which assumptions on the mechanism are
necessary/sufficient to extend our theoretical bound to richer settings. Second, in the long run, it
would be interesting to develop BNE algorithms that scale to real-world-sized problems. As we
have discussed, the main difficulty in scaling our algorithm lies in the richness of the bidding space.
Thus, future work targeting scalability could investigate how to exploit certain structure inherent to
the problem of interest (e.g., monotonicity properties of the mechanism) to focus the computational
effort on the most relevant parts of the value or action spaces.
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